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INTRODUCTION
The third-party and public disclosure doctrines are longstanding
hurdles to Fourth Amendment protection. Federal courts have recently
invoked these doctrines to determine whether police can acquire cell phone
location data from providers without constitutional scrutiny.1 These rulings
are all over the map. Courts disagree not only on whether location
information is constitutionally protected but also if one, both, or neither of
these doctrines applies. The Supreme Court has yet to enter the fray. So for
now, we are left with muddled results.2 A major reason for the confusion
turns out to rest on a hitherto overlooked tension between the two
doctrines. This Essay is the first to raise this issue and, in turn, harmonize
these doctrines in the cell phone location data context.3
While both doctrines vitiate privacy protection and are often
associated together, they rest on unique foundational triggers.4 The thirdparty doctrine involves an individual voluntarily disclosing nonpublic
information to an actual person or entity. The Supreme Court has applied
this doctrine to statements made to undercover informants,5 bank records
released to banks,6 and telephone numbers disclosed to phone providers.7
The public disclosure doctrine, on the other hand, focuses on a suspect
making voluntary public movements that are susceptible to visual
surveillance. The Court has applied this doctrine to police surveillance of
suspects using beeper technology8 or a GPS device.9
*
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1
See infra Part III.
2
See, e.g., Orin Kerr, When and How Will the Supreme Court Enter the Cell-Site Fray?
Washington Post (August 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2015/08/05/when-and-how-will-the-supreme-court-enter-the-cell-site-fray [http://perma.cc/U6YRVR6Z].
3
This Essay focuses exclusively on constitutional protection without reference to statutory
authority or any good faith exception analysis. For an example of such analysis, see generally id.
4
See infra Parts II.A and II.B.
5
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) [http://perma.cc/L74Y-Z2P8].
6
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) [http://perma.cc/9A9Z-6AQA].
7
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) [http://perma.cc/BWV6-HN5Z].
8
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) [http://perma.cc/R672-AVL6].
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Courts seem to pick and choose a doctrine when analyzing cell phone
location data, with little to no analysis on why one or the other applies (or
doesn’t apply).10 These inconsistent choices are primarily due to the unique
nature of this technology and the different ways one can conceptualize how
the government collects it. The data can be viewed as nonpublic
information disclosed to a cell phone provider, suggesting a potential
application of the third-party doctrine, or as public movements susceptible
to visual surveillance, suggesting a potential application of the public
disclosure doctrine. But the key to applying the right doctrine is
recognizing in which of these two contexts the government activity is
taking place. It matters, for example, whether the government is seeking
historical cell phone location data or acquiring real-time data. This Essay
provides the first workable topology for these various scenarios and, in the
process, offers some much overdue clarification on the operative elements
of the respective doctrines.
Part I introduces how cell phone location data is created and collected.
Part II details the contours of the third-party and public disclosure
doctrines. Part III highlights the split among federal courts regarding
whether the Fourth Amendment protects against the collection of cell
phone location data, particularly in light of the varying applications of the
third-party and public disclosure doctrines. Part IV outlines an approach for
determining which of the two doctrines should apply. Finally, the Essay
concludes by noting the implications of the cell phone location data Fourth
Amendment conundrum for future technological developments.
I.
A PRIMER ON CELL PHONE LOCATION DATA
Cell phones use radio waves to connect to their service provider in
order to facilitate a host of functions, including making and receiving
phone calls, sending and receiving text messages, and using the Internet.11
Cell phone providers, in turn, maintain thousands of cell phone towers that
receive these radio signals.12 Cell phones emit these signals anytime they
are turned on, after which the nearest cell phone tower acquires a signal.13
This process is automatic without any notice to the user and a user does
nothing to facilitate the transmission except turning on the phone.14 The
signal moves from tower to tower as a cell phone user changes location and

9

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) [http://perma.cc/SFV6-PQ76].
See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010) [http://perma.cc/994DRRAE]; infra Part III.
11
See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 637 (N.J. 2013) (discussing the basics of how cell phone
location data works) [http://perma.cc/V3SH-S4PK].
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
United States v. Graham, No 12-4659, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *47 (4th Cir. August 5,
2015) [http://perma.cc/2S5Y-ME6M]; Earls, 70 A.3d at 637.
10
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the location of the nearest tower is transmitted to the provider.15 Cell phone
company privacy policies typically include language that a user’s location
is collected in the foregoing way.16
It is useful to recognize three different scenarios under which the
government tracks movements through the acquisition of cell phone
location data: (1) historical cell phone location data, (2) real-time cell
phone location data, and (3) actively “pinging” a cell phone for location
data.
Cell phone providers store location data as the normal part of their
business of providing service.17 Police, in turn, can request that cell phone
providers hand over this location data for a suspect over a set period of
time.18 This information is classified as historical cell phone location data.
This data stands in contrast to real-time location data. Whereas the
former focuses on past locations, real-time data provides locations as they
actually occur.19 Here, cell phone providers, upon request, give police
contemporaneous data on the location of the nearest cell tower for tracking
purposes.20
“Pinging” a cell phone is a variation on the collection of
contemporaneous cell phone location data. This time, however, the
government does not wait for the phone itself to send its routine signal to
the cell tower. Rather, the police request that cell phone providers send an
affirmative signal to the suspect’s phone in order to monitor her location
via cell towers.21

15

Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not
Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 702 (2011) [http://perma.cc/P2R6-NFJB]; see also Earls, 70 A.3d at 637–38
(“Network-based location tracking relies on the network of cell sites and antennas.”). Depending on the
provider and particular cell phone, the actual location of the cell phone may also be transmitted.
Freiwald, supra at 713 (discussing how certain smart phones are equipped with GPS capability and that
the phone’s specific location may also be transmitted to a provider). Because this additional
transmission may reveal otherwise private information, the Fourth Amendment analysis under the
public disclosure doctrine could potentially come out differently. See infra note 40 and accompanying
text.
16
Graham, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *20–21.
17
Earls, 70 A.3d at 637.
18
See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013)
[http://perma.cc/3L9X-GP22]; Graham, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *9, *16 (stating “[t]he
precision of this location data depends on the size of the identified cell sites’ geographical coverage
ranges”).
19
See Patrick E. Corbett, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Site Location Information: What Should
We Do While We Wait for the Supremes?, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 215, 217 (2015).
20
See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132–33
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) [http://perma.cc/E4SC-AHZP]. If available, police may also request the historical
location data of the actual cell phone. Freiwald, supra note 15, at 713–14 (noting that certain police
departments request the actual cell phone location whereas others only request the nearest cell tower).
21
United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 350–51, 360 (D. Vt. 2013)
[http://perma.cc/DL3E-YHHZ]. Users are not aware that this pinging is taking place. Id. at 350, 360.
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II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT DISCLOSURE DOCTRINES

A. The Contours of the Third-Party Doctrine
The basic premise of the third-party doctrine is readily known: an
individual loses all reasonable expectation of privacy to information she
discloses to another person or entity.22 The roots of the doctrine trace back
to the use of government informants. The government has always had the
unfettered ability to elicit incriminating statements from unwary suspects.23
As the Court has explained, it is of no consequence that a defendant
revealed the information “on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.”24 This misplaced belief does not change the fact that the
defendant voluntarily disclosed the information and thus took the risk that
the government might obtain it without a warrant and use it against her at
trial.25 The Court has expanded the application of the doctrine to include
voluntary disclosures made to entities such as banks and telephone
companies.26
A central feature of the doctrine is whether the disclosure was
voluntary or otherwise not coerced. As one simple example, eliciting
incriminating statements by putting a gun to a suspect’s head would, in all
likelihood, not satisfy the voluntariness requirement. This seems like an
easy case. More recently, courts and scholars have questioned this
requirement of voluntariness—and in turn, the application of the third-party
doctrine—in today’s technology-dominated world where we routinely (and
almost necessarily) make many disclosures to many entities.27 Whether it is
disclosures to banks or emails sent via internet service providers, we are
constantly making disclosures to third parties. Should these actions
appropriately be considered voluntary? There may not be an easy answer
here.28 Indeed, part of the disagreement on whether the third-party doctrine
22

Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth Amendment Mosaic
Theory, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1809, 1820–26 (2014) (discussing evolution of third-party doctrine before and
after United States v. Katz) [http://perma.cc/6DZ3-QZW2].
23
See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
437–39 (1963) [http://perma.cc/72N2-HU7A].
24
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see also Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (“Neither this
Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not
reveal it.”).
25
Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. For this reason, some scholars talk about the principle as a waiver or
consent principle. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
588–90 (2009); Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 216–18
(2011) [http://perma.cc/K4FC-9SM5].
26
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
27
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning
the viability of the third-party doctrine in today’s technologically dominated society); Monu Bedi,
Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1, 25–28 (2013) (discussing scholars’ reactions to technological advancements when it comes to
application of the third-party doctrine) [http://perma.cc/WCD7-9SCY].
28
Bedi, supra note 27, at 27.
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applies to cell phone location data stems from this issue of voluntariness.29
So ends the typical discussion of the doctrine. But this summary
neglects some important considerations that bear on its application. The
first relates to when the government can acquire the information. Is the
government free to acquire the information at any point before it is
conveyed to the third party, or must the information come from the third
party itself?
Take the facts of Smith v. Maryland.30 There, the government collected
a dialed telephone number after it was conveyed to a telephone company in
the normal course of making a call. But if the number is not protected due
to its disclosure to the phone company, can the government acquire it
before it reaches the company? On the one hand, the police could not,
without first getting a warrant, enter a suspect’s home and observe the
suspect dial the number.31 But what about tapping into public lines and
acquiring the number before it reaches the company? This action would not
otherwise seem to implicate the suspect’s individual Fourth Amendment
rights.32
The analysis in Smith suggests that the government must retrieve
information from and with the knowledge of the third party. Otherwise, the
assumption of risk analysis loses its meaning. The whole point of the
expectation that a government informant or telephone company might
disclose information assumes in the first instance that they have received
some information.33
It also seems that the disclosed information must be nonpublic. It is no
accident that the Court talks about misplaced trust when discussing the
effect of the doctrine.34 The premise here is that the information is not
public and the person assumes the risk that the third party will nonetheless
hand it over to the government. If the information were otherwise publicly
available, the individual wouldn’t really be taking on any additional risk by
disclosing it to the third party. The above cases bear this out.35 Whether it is
statements to a confidential informant, bank statements to a bank, or
telephone numbers to a phone company, each of these types of information
are private or not otherwise publicly available.

29

See infra Part III.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
31
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) [http://perma.cc/C54W-A963].
32
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (reaffirming that Fourth Amendment
protection only applies where individual has personal expectation of privacy) [http://perma.cc/ZVR98Z33].
33
This doesn’t mean that the government would need a warrant to tap into the public phone lines,
but rather simply that the third-party doctrine would not seem to play a role here in assessing Fourth
Amendment protection (or the lack of it).
34
See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966).
35
See Smith, 442 U.S. 735; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293.
30
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B. The Contours of the Public Disclosure Doctrine
Courts and scholars alike often associate the public disclosure doctrine
and third-party doctrine as expressing a singular principle.36 In some ways,
this makes sense, as both doctrines involve voluntary actions by suspects
that, in turn, vitiate Fourth Amendment protection. With the public
disclosure doctrine, however, the focus is not on disclosing information but
rather on making public movements or those movements that are
susceptible to visual observation. In short, a suspect does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her voluntarily disclosed public
movements.37 In United States v. Knotts, for example, the police
surreptitiously placed a beeper in the defendant’s belongings and used it to
follow the defendant for a few hours to his ultimate destination.38 The Court
found no problem with this type of surveillance, reasoning that:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another. When [the defendant] travelled over the public streets he voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over
particular roads in a particular direction . . . .39

The key here is that the police only monitored public movements, not
movements within a person’s home where the Fourth Amendment would
clearly apply.40 Moreover, it didn’t matter that the suspect was unaware of
the beeper transmission or that the police were not in constant visual
contact with the car as long as the movements were susceptible to visual
surveillance.41 The analysis of Knotts under the third-party doctrine, on the
other hand, would have come out differently. Since the suspect was not
aware of the beeper and its emanating signal, the suspect could not have
voluntarily disclosed his movements to the police.

36

See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(discussing the general viability of the third-party doctrine when assessing the permissibility of longterm GPS surveillance); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983) (referencing Smith v.
Maryland as the “factual counterpart” to beeper monitoring); Miriam Baer, Secrecy, Intimacy, and
Workable Rules: Justice Sotomayor Stakes Out the Middle Ground in United States v. Jones, 123 YALE
L.J. F. 393 (2014) [http://perma.cc/VS2G-5P23]; Bedi, supra note 22, at 1820–26; Kerr, supra note 25,
at 588–90.
37
Bedi, supra note 22, at 1820–26 (discussing evolution of public disclosure doctrine before and
after United States v. Katz).
38
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
39
Id. at 281–82.
40
Compare Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984)
(finding that monitoring movements within the home triggered Fourth Amendment protection). The
concern over nonpublic information may potentially impact how one analyzes location data of an actual
cell phone as opposed to a public cell tower under the Fourth Amendment. If the former location data
reveals a person’s movements in her home or a place where she has a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the public disclosure doctrine would not apply. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citing the Knotts/Karo distinction when discussing the potential of historical location data
revealing nonpublic locations but concluding not relevant on instant facts as the government only
acquired cell tower or public location data).
41
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
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The public disclosure doctrine thus does not implicate the same issues
of how or when the government obtains information. The reason for this is
the public nature of the movements (e.g., the car’s location) serves as the
sole trigger. Because this information is susceptible to visual observation, it
is per se not protected under the Fourth Amendment.
One can still use the assumption of risk calculus with the public
disclosure doctrine but it looks different than the third-party doctrine
analysis. The risk here relates to the government’s surveillance of a
person’s public movements rather than its acquisition of private
information from an entity or person.42
The public disclosure doctrine is not without potential limits. Knotts
itself suggested that a different conclusion may be necessary if the
monitoring lasted a day or longer.43 It is telling that the Court made explicit
that “different constitutional principles” would be needed to analyze this
long-term surveillance, and in doing so, cited to a First Amendment-related
case.44 This analysis implies that the public disclosure doctrine on its own
would treat long-term surveillance no differently than short-term
surveillance—neither would receive Fourth Amendment protection.
This concern over the potentially harsh implications of long-term
electronic surveillance under the public disclosure doctrine leads to the
most recent case on the doctrine, United States v. Jones.45 Here, the
government—without the consent of the defendant or under the terms of a
warrant—installed a Global Positioning Device (GPS) device under his car
and tracked his public movements with the device for nearly thirty days.46
The Court (both the majority and concurrences) wrestled with how this
government activity could fall under the scrutiny of the Fourth Amendment
when the public disclosure doctrine mandated that none of this surveillance
would garner constitutional protection.47 The majority focused on the initial
act of placing the GPS device as constituting an unlawful physical trespass,
whereas the concurrences focused on the revelation of private information

42

In turn, the debate over the voluntariness of disclosing location data under the third-party
doctrine isn’t an issue in the public disclosure context. The cell phone user quite obviously has
voluntarily exposed her public movements to potential visual observation.
43
The concern here was dragnet activity by the government. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84.
44
Id. The Court cited to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978)
[http://perma.cc/9WQR-UYBK], which found that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
adequately protects First Amendment interests. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283; see also Bedi, supra note 22, at
1848–57 (discussing First Amendment values in Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation analysis).
45
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
46
Id. at 948.
47
Id. at 951–52 (explaining that while there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public
movements, this did not overturn the common law trespass doctrine); id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the Government might obtain the fruits of GPS
monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance techniques.”); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)
(citing Knotts for the proposition that short-term surveillance does not trigger Fourth Amendment
protection).
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(e.g., political affiliations) as a byproduct of long-term GPS surveillance.48
Analysis of these limiting principles is beyond the scope of this Essay.49
What matters for my purposes is that the majority decision bypassed the
chance to alter the contours of the public disclosure doctrine, which for
now does not hinge on the length of surveillance.50
III.

DISAGREEMENT AMONGST FEDERAL COURTS ANALYZING
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR CELL PHONE LOCATION
DATA

A. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
A number of federal circuits have found that cell phone location data
does not garner Fourth Amendment protection. Both the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, in their assessment of the collection of historical location data,
relied on a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine and
suspects making a voluntary disclosure.51 The Fifth Circuit, for example,
analogizing to Smith v. Maryland, reasoned, “A cell service subscriber, like
a telephone user, understands that his cell phone must send a signal to a
nearby cell tower in order to wirelessly connect his call.”52
The Third Circuit, in reaching a similar conclusion, focused instead on
the public disclosure doctrine.53 Citing Knotts, the court explained:
We cannot reject the hypothesis that [historical cell phone location data] may,
under certain circumstances, be used to approximate the past location of a
person . . . . [Prior opinions] make clear that the privacy interests at issue are
confined to the interior of the home. There is no evidence in this record that
historical [cell phone location data] . . . extends to that realm. We therefore
cannot accept the . . . conclusion that [this data] . . . requires probable cause
for its production.54

The Third Circuit’s point here seems to be that historical cell phone
48

Id. at 950–54 (majority opinion); id. at 955–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 961–64 (Alito,
J., concurring). The theory put forth by the concurrences has been dubbed the “mosaic theory.” See
Bedi, supra note 22, at 1834–38.
49
For a discussion on the physical trespass doctrine and the mosaic theory, see generally Andrew
Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1283 (2014) [http://perma.cc/G9L2-D7UJ]; Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v.
Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 17–32 (2012) [http://perma.cc/CG4X-S2VP].
50
Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 954 (majority opinion) (“It may be that achieving [four-week surveillance]
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy,
but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”). In fact, drawing a defensible line as
to when surveillance becomes too long to fall under the public disclosure doctrine seems untenable. See
Bedi, supra note 22, at 1839–48 (discussing various problems with the mosaic theory).
51
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir 2015) [http://perma.cc/L4BY-8JR7]; In re
Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
52
In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613; see also Davis, 785 F.3d
at 512.
53
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
54
Id. at 312–13.
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location data is no different from the location data documented by other
tracking device technology that simply catalogs public locations.
Interestingly, however, and in contrast with the Fifth Circuit, the Third
Circuit went on to explain that the third-party doctrine would not
necessarily support the same conclusion since a cell phone user does not
voluntary share location data with her cell phone provider.55
Real-time location data would appear to fall or stand with historical
location data. This information is also initially disclosed to a cell phone
provider, albeit quickly transmitted to the government thereafter. For this
reason, some courts have treated historical and real-time data the same
way, finding no protection based on an application of the third-party
doctrine.56
The Sixth Circuit has gone one step further by finding that pinging a
cell phone user’s phone to ascertain her real-time location also does not
trigger Fourth Amendment protection.57 In reaching its conclusion, the
court distinguished between the effects of the public disclosure doctrine
and the third-party doctrine in this context.58 The court analogized to Knotts
and reasoned that the police could have acquired “that same
information . . . through visual surveillance.”59 At the same time, the court
also seemed to recognize that the third-party doctrine may suggest a
different outcome.60 It was the government’s act of pinging the cell phone
that triggered the location, not a voluntary act by the cell phone user.61
However, because the real-time data was simply a proxy for a suspect’s
public location, there was no Fourth Amendment protection.62
B. Finding Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Other courts have found that this data should, at least in some
circumstances, garner Fourth Amendment protection. These decisions often
emphasize the voluntariness element (or lack of it) in the application of the
third-party doctrine. The most recent decision on the issue comes from the
Fourth Circuit, which found that, unlike the telephone user in Smith v.
Maryland who knowingly conveyed the number dialed, the cell phone
55

Id. at 317.
See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 145–47
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); United States v. Booker, No. 1:11-CR-255-1-TWT, 2013 WL 2903562, at *9 (N.D.
Ga. June 13, 2013).
57
The Sixth Circuit has ruled in two cases on this matter. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772
(6th Cir 2012) [http://perma.cc/QR7B-TF2X]; United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004)
[http://perma.cc/GZ4Z-5UBA], cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1100
(2005).
58
Forest, 355 F.3d at 951–52.
59
Skinner, 690 F.3 at 778. Similar to Knotts, the court found that it was not crucial that the
government may not have had visual contact throughout the full-length surveillance. The key fact was
that the movements could be observed by visual observation. Id. at 779.
60
Forest, 355 F.3d at 951.
61
Id.
62
Id.
56
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provider did not voluntarily share her location in any meaningful way.63
The court reasoned, “A cell phone user cannot be said to ‘voluntarily
convey’ to her service provider information that she never held but was
instead generated by the service provider itself without the user’s
involvement.”64 The court also found that the fact the company’s privacy
policies mentioned this collection did not suggest a different conclusion
since most users are not familiar with or otherwise understand their
provider’s policies.65
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion on the issue of
voluntariness.66 But what makes its decision so interesting is that the court
simultaneously acknowledged that the public disclosure doctrine would
suggest that this same data is not protected.67 This tension between the two
disclosure doctrines underscores the different foundational triggers
underlying each. More on this later.
Some courts have also used the voluntariness element to distinguish
Smith v. Maryland from real-time location data.68 As one district court
explained, “Unlike dialed telephone numbers, cell site data is not
‘voluntarily conveyed’ by the user to the phone company. [Rather,] it is
transmitted automatically during the registration process, entirely
independent of the user’s input, control, or knowledge.”69
It is interesting how these cases appear to discount the public
disclosure doctrine. To the extent it applies, the doctrine does not depend
on whether a court classifies the transmission of the location data as
voluntary or not. Nor does it matter how the government acquired the data.
All that matters is that the movements are vulnerable to visual observation.
The Fourth Circuit discussed the public disclosure doctrine but
concluded it did not ultimately apply to the facts at hand. The court seemed
to make a two-fold argument. First, it denied the basic premise that
historical location data reveals otherwise public information. “[U]nlike
GPS monitoring of a vehicle, examination of historical [cell phone data]
can permit the government to track a person’s movements between public
and private spaces, impacting at once her interests in both the privacy of
her movements and the privacy of her home.”70 The court cited to the risk
of cell phone tower location data revealing private information such as

63

United States v. Graham, No 12-4659, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *46 (4th Cir. August 5,

2015).
64

Id. at *52.
Id. at *20–21 and n.3.
66
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010).
67
See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
68
In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth.,
396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756–57 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [http://perma.cc/9ZBU-ELAP].
69
Id.
70
Graham, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *30.
65

70

110:61 (2015)

The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data

outpatient medical treatment or regular church visits.71
It is not clear whether this line of reasoning is ultimately persuasive.
The same objection can also apply to public car movements such as those
in Knotts. Police can surveil a suspect’s car entering a church parking lot or
medical complex. These acts would also seemingly reveal personal
information but none are currently protected because of the public
disclosure doctrine. Both cell phone tower data and a car’s movements
through streets are public information and thus stand or fall together.72
The Fourth Circuit also relied on the Jones concurrences in finding
that the sheer amount of data revealed (in this case, it was movements over
220 days) militated against a straightforward application of the public
disclosure doctrine.73 These discussions on the privacy implications of
long-term surveillance—while interesting and worthy of consideration—
are ultimately beyond the scope of this Essay, because current precedent
dictates that all public monitoring—regardless of length—carries no Fourth
Amendment protection.74
IV.

PICKING AND CHOOSING BETWEEN THE DOCTRINES: A ROAD TO
HARMONY
As the previous Part illustrates, courts seem to be all over the map
when it comes to analyzing cell phone location data under the Fourth
Amendment and whether this data merits protection. This disagreement
largely centers on which doctrine a court uses and how it uses that doctrine.
Take, for example, the application of the third-party doctrine. A major
point of contention is whether a cell phone user actually voluntarily
discloses her location when making or receiving calls. This seems like a
legitimate issue on which reasonable people can disagree. Because a user’s
location—unlike a dialed number—is automatically transmitted after the
phone turns on, this action may not qualify as a voluntary disclosure.
Scholars too disagree on this point.75 Perhaps the question of voluntariness
71
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should influence how we analyze the doctrine in this context, particularly
given how prevalent cell phone use has become.
The more troubling area of disagreement, however, and the focus of
this Essay, is how we should pick between the third-party and public
disclosure doctrines. The analysis is not as cut and dry, as evidenced by the
different way courts have handled this choice. And the decision seems
rather consequential when one considers that the public disclosure doctrine
suggests none of this data is protected. To see the problem, one needs only
to look at the Third Circuit and its explicit recognition that the two
doctrines lead to different conclusions on the privacy question of historical
location data.76 Things get even more complicated when considering the
other kinds of cell phone location data—real-time location data and pinged
data—and the different ways courts have handled them. Are we simply left
with ad hoc judgments on which doctrine to use in what context, or is there
some principled way for courts to make this choice?77
The problem centers on the unique nature of cell phone location data.
On the one hand, the government can treat it like the collection of
nonpublic information, no different than dialed telephone numbers (think
historical location data). On the other hand, this data can also be seen as
publicly available data that facilitates surveillance, no different than GPS
monitoring (think real-time location data).
Historically, the collection of nonpublic information and surveillance
of public movements were neatly separated. Collection of bank records,
telephone numbers, and incriminating statements are all informationgathering activities of nonpublic data that have nothing to do with
surveillance of the suspect’s physical location. On the other hand, use of
beeper technology and GPS are surveillance methods of a suspect’s public
movements that do nothing more than relay her physical location.78
Police use of cell phone location data has blurred the line between
these two types of activities. The first step to harmonizing the doctrines,
then, is ascertaining in which context the government activity occurs with
the recognition that the application of two doctrines is not mutually
exclusive. I take the three scenarios in turn.
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A. Historical Location Data
The government seeking historical location data from the cell provider
stands on the same footing as the government acquiring a history of
telephone numbers from the telephone company over a period of time.
Both scenarios only potentially trigger an application of the third-party
doctrine. The government is collecting nonpublic information from a third
party. Whether the doctrine actually applies of course still depends on
whether the disclosure of data to the provider is considered a voluntary one.
One may take issue with my conclusion that the public disclosure
doctrine is inapplicable here. Were these movements not public at one time,
thus triggering this doctrine? To be sure, the Third and Fourth Circuits
discussed this doctrine at length in the context of historical location data,
albeit reaching different conclusions as to its applicability.79 But the
problem here is we’re talking about public data in the past tense. These
were public movements and at that time the government could have
surveilled the person’s location using this data without first seeking a
warrant. But these data points—at the point the government is now seeking
them from the provider—are no longer public (i.e., susceptible to visual
surveillance) and, as such, the risk of the government observing them has
now passed along with application of the public disclosure doctrine. In fact,
it seems odd to say that the government, in collecting historical data, is
nonetheless surveilling the suspect’s public movements when those
movements are no longer taking place. This is not to say that the police
cannot gather this historical data to conduct prospective surveillance of the
suspect, but the suspect’s potential future public movements are
conceptually different from prior public movements and the collection of
her historical location data. The latter are now no different than any other
nonpublic information—whether it is telephone numbers, bank statements,
etc.—the government acquires from a third party.80
In some ways, this is a better outcome for those who think historical
location data deserves constitutional protection. If the public disclosure
doctrine does not reach this data, there is no need to argue against its
application. This conclusion renders moot much of the aforementioned
Fourth Circuit discussion on the more private nature of cell phone versus
automobile location data, as well as the concern over large amounts of
surveillance records.
79
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That said, the privacy implications of the latter could also work as a
limiting principle for the third-party doctrine. While the operative facts of
Jones dealt with contemporaneous surveillance, a historical map of an
individual’s movements over a lengthy period of time may also trigger
privacy concerns for the same reason (e.g., revelation of a person’s political
affiliation or medical treatment).81 Whether the effects of long-term
historical data collection should be part of the third-party doctrine analysis
is, again, beyond the scope of this Essay.
B. Real-Time Location Data
Categorizing real-time location data is a bit trickier. This kind of data
can potentially be analyzed under both doctrines. In one sense, the
government is acquiring information from the cell phone provider, very
similar to historical data or telephone numbers. Whether the third-party
doctrine is triggered, however, depends in large part on how one
conceptualizes the risk of exposure. Certainly, as previously explained, the
main thrust of the doctrine contemplates nonpublic information. Still, one
could argue that this doctrine does not require only one risk. In other
words, an individual could be taking on both the risk that the user’s
location may be disclosed by the particular third party as well as the risk
that it is currently susceptible to public view.82
This is an interesting discussion but ultimately turns out to be
irrelevant when assessing Fourth Amendment protection. Whichever way
one answers the question of the potential reach of the third-party doctrine
to real-time location data, there is no privacy protection because the public
disclosure doctrine obviously applies. The government is using public
location data—i.e., movements susceptible to visual surveillance—to
contemporaneously track a suspect.83 This is no different than the
government using a beeper or GPS device to surveil an individual.
While the applicability of the public disclosure doctrine is
straightforward, the operative facts for the third-party doctrine may not be
present. This is not problematic. These doctrines were never designed to
both be necessary conditions for vitiating privacy protection. Take the
Knotts case. There, a fortiori, the third-party doctrine does not apply
because the suspect—lacking knowledge of the beeper—could not possibly
have voluntarily conveyed his location to the government. This fact was
not relevant to the lack of privacy protection because the suspect’s public
movements fell directly under the public disclosure doctrine.
The difference in Fourth Amendment protection between real-time
data (automatically not protected under public disclosure doctrine) and
historical data (may not be protected under the third-party doctrine) makes
81
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sense when assessing the relative privacy concerns in each scenario. With
stored data, the police can have easy access to significant amounts of
location history. There is no practical limitation to the timeframe they may
acquire. This concern may militate in favor of having a robust requirement
of voluntariness under the third-party doctrine so it is harder to acquire this
information without Fourth Amendment protection. On the other hand, use
of real-time data has some built-in practical limitations. It requires at least
some sort contemporaneous police surveillance (even if alleviated by the
relevant technology), which naturally limits how much data is collected.
Here then, a straightforward application of the public disclosure doctrine
may not be as detrimental to privacy concerns.
C. Location Data from “Pinging”
Analysis of the third scenario involving pinging a cell phone would
work in a similar way to real-time data. Here, the third-party doctrine is
clearly not applicable because there has been no disclosure by the cell
phone user. It is the cell phone company—in concert with the
government—that is actively sending signals to the cell phone. Once again,
though, the public disclosure doctrine squarely applies as the government is
tracking the public movements of the cell phone user via the provider’s cell
towers.84 Those who feel that real-time location data should garner Fourth
Amendment protection must argue for the Court to adopt some limiting
principle—e.g., length of surveillance—to curtail the impact of the public
disclosure doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The lessons here go beyond cell phone location data. If there is
anything to be certain of, it is that technology will continue to advance.
This inevitably will lead police to having better information-gathering
capacity and surveillance ability. Unless the Court acts, the third-party and
public disclosure doctrines will continue to stand as two central hurdles to
Fourth Amendment protection in these situations. It is important we
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understand the historical context and unique contours of each doctrine.
Only then can we intelligently discuss whether and how they should, or
should not, apply to future technologies.
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